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Abstract—By using small computing devices deployed at user
premises, Autonomous Demand Response (ADR) adapts users
electricity consumption to given time-dependent electricity tariffs.
This allows end-users to save on their electricity bill and Dis-
tribution System Operators to optimise (through suitable time-
dependent tariffs) management of the electric grid by avoiding
demand peaks.
Unfortunately, even with ADR, users power consumption may
deviate from the expected (minimum cost) one, e.g., because ADR
devices fail to correctly forecast energy needs at user premises. As
a result, the aggregated power demand may present undesirable
peaks.
In this paper we address such a problem by presenting
methods and a software tool (APD-Analyser) implementing them,
enabling Distribution System Operators to effectively verify that
a given time-dependent electricity tariff achieves the desired goals
even when end-users deviate from their expected behaviour.
We show feasibility of the proposed approach through a
realistic scenario from a medium voltage Danish distribution
network.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging problems in the management
of modern electric smart grids is to find a trade-off between
two conflicting goals. On one hand both the energy retailer,
who sells energy, and the Distribution System Operator (DSO),
who manages the Electric Distribution Network (EDN), want
to sell as much energy as possible, without forcing end-users
to cut their power demands. On the other hand, if all users
require power at the same time (peak time), this may result in
higher costs for the DSO (due to, e.g., the need of suddenly
activating additional power plants to face such peaks), and
possible service and/or infrastructure disruption (due to, e.g.,
feeder damage or reduced life-time [1]). In fact, the maximum
power that can be safely provided by an EDN (i.e., without
stressing the infrastructure devices) is significantly less than
the power that would be needed in the most demanding
scenario, when all users request their maximum allowed power
simultaneously [2].
Demand Side Management (DSM) [3] approaches are used
to achieve the objective of reducing/avoiding the presence of
dangerous peaks in the Aggregated Power Demand (APD)
(thus performing what is called peak shaving). An increasingly
popular approach to DSM is Demand Response (DR) (see,
e.g., [4] and references therein). In a DR setting, Inclining
Block Rate or time-dependent tariffs are computed by the DSO
and proposed to the users, with the goal of indirectly steering
their individual power demands in such a way that the APD
satisfies EDN constraints.
Classically, DR has been implemented by directly including
such tariffs in the user contracts. However, this approach poses
two main problems: 1) tariffs explicitly included in the user
contracts are long-term and static, as users must be able to get
used to and comfortably follow them; 2) such tariffs might
not be enough to sufficiently diversify the individual user
power demands, thus simply resulting in peak rebounds (see,
e.g., [5]), where the critical peaks of the APD at the substation
level are not removed, but just shifted in time.
A. Motivations
Recent advancements in energy storage technology and
electricity usage control algorithms enabled innovative ap-
proaches to DR (see, e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9]) where small com-
puting devices (in the following: Home Energy Controllers,
HECs) are deployed at user premises to autonomously shift
high loads (e.g., charging of Plug-in Electric Vehicles, or
heating), control local electricity generators (e.g., Photovoltaic
panels) and storage (e.g., batteries), compatibly with user
actual behaviour and device capabilities (e.g., capacities and
power rates of installed batteries), while reacting to electricity
price changes. Their ultimate goal is to minimise the user
electricity bills.
In such Autonomous Demand Response (ADR) settings,
the users are freed from the burden to manually adapting
their electricity consumption behaviours, as reactions to price
changes are handled automatically. All this allows DSOs
to propose time-dependent tariffs envisioning high-frequency
fluctuations (e.g., a new price every 15 minutes) announced
with short notice (e.g., 24 hours in advance), exploiting, e.g.,
quotes of the day-ahead market (see, e.g., [10]). Also, such
price policies can be diversified among users connected to the
same EDN substation (under non-discrimination requirements,
see e.g., [4]) in order to induce their HECs to react in
complementary ways, ultimately producing an APD compat-
ible with the grid safety constraints. To this end, designed
price policies must take into consideration suitable short-term
forecasts of each user power demand (which are typically
based on historical demand plus, possibly, other data, see,
e.g., [11]).
In this paper we focus on such ADR scenarios. The design
of short-term, individualised price policies based on single
user power demand forecasts and envisioning highly fluctu-
ating prices poses several computational challenges for the
DSO. In previous work [4] we proposed global optimisation
algorithmic methods to support the price policy design phase,
building on mature technologies widely used in many diverse
application domains (see, e.g., [12], [13], [14], [15]). Anyway,
although global optimisation guarantees to return a set of
policies (if one such set exists) that would satisfy all the
requirements, in practice the grid safety is still not guaranteed.
This is because, due to the limits of HEC capabilities, the
actual user power demands may not follow the power profiles
expected by the DSO as a result of the proposed price policies.
Although the DSO can perform a worst case analysis (as
in, e.g., [16]) of the impact of the envisioned set of price
policies on the EDN safety, such an analysis could be too
pessimistic and prevent the DSO from fully exploiting the
opportunities stemming from highly fluctuating tariffs and its
own investments on the EDN.
B. Contributions
In this paper we propose Aggregated Power Demand Anal-
yser (APD-Analyser), a High Performance Computing (HPC)-
based software system aimed at supporting DSOs in analysing
the possible aggregated effects, on the EDN substation, of
individualised price policies for electricity end-users, designed
for highly dynamic ADR schemes.
In particular, APD-Analyser allows DSOs to compute a
portfolio of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) over the
probability distribution of the APD, subject to probabilistic
deviations of end-users from their predicted behaviours under
the given price policies.
APD-Analyser can then act both as a Decision Support
System allowing what-if analyses, and as an automated verifier
for the safety of an envisioned set of price policies. In
particular, APD-Analyser enables safety assessment of the
price policies computed through automated methods (e.g., [4]
and references therein).
II. AGGREGATED POWER DEMAND ANALYSER
In this section we describe the input required and the output
provided by APD-Analyser. In the following, we denote with
R, R+, N the sets of, resp., all real, strictly positive real, and
non-negative integer numbers.
We assume that the period for which we want to compute
the APD probability distribution (e.g., the next day) is split
into a set T of time slots of equal duration (e.g., 15 minutes).
Given T , a power profile is a function p : T → R. For
each t ∈ T , p(t) denotes a power value (in kW). We use such
functions to model both the users’ Expected Power Profiles
(EPPs) (in this case p(t) gives the average power demanded
by a given user during time slot t) and the substation safety
threshold (in this case p(t) gives the maximum average power
that the substation can provide during time slot t in safe
conditions).
A. Inputs
The system requires the DSO to provide various inputs and
configuration options, the most important of which are briefly
outlined in the following.
1) EDN substation end-users: The finite set U of end-
users (households, commercial buildings, etc.) connected to
the EDN substation of interest.
2) Analysis time period: The future period of interest, as
a set of contiguous time slots T of the same duration (e.g.,
15-minute time slots spanning the next day).
3) Expected Power Profiles (EPPs): The EPPs of all end-
users in U , defined under the (optimistic) assumption that
end-users will adhere to the price policies under analysis, as
predicted by the DSO. Such EPPs may be either computed
by some grid-level service [4] or forecasted using, e.g., users
historical data or other information (see, e.g., [11]). EPPs are
defined in terms of a power profile pu over T for each u ∈ U .
Note that EPPs functions can take negative power values, to
account for, e.g., power generation capabilities at end-user
premises, for example Photovoltaic installations.
4) Users deviation model: A probabilistic model of end-
user deviations wrt. their expected behaviours, given in terms
of a function devu : Du → [0, 1] for each u ∈ U , where Du is
a bounded interval of real values defining possible deviations
of u wrt. their EPP. For each user u ∈ U , devu defines a
probability density function (over bounded support Du), hence∫
Du
devu(x)dx = 1. For each u ∈ U and a, b ∈ Du (a <
b),
∫ b
a
devu(x)dx defines the probability that u will deviate
from their EPP by a factor between a and b, i.e., that in any
time slot t ∈ T , the actual power demand of u is within
[(1 + a)pu(t), (1 + b)pu(t)]. User deviation probabilities can
be retrieved from historical data, e.g., by comparing past users’
EPPs to their actual behaviours. Also, to overcome the intrinsic
uncertainty of users behaviour predictability, sets Du of users’
possible deviations can be rather generous (e.g., in our case
study of Section VI we allowed, for all users, deviations as
high as ±40% wrt. their EPPs).
5) Substation safety requirements: The substation safety
thresholds during T , in terms of a power profile ps : T → R.
To keep the substation line (and hence the EDN) safe, the APD
must be less than or equal to ps(t) in any time slot t ∈ T .
6) KPIs: A finite set K of KPIs defined over the probability
distribution of the APD of the EDN substation, for different
values of the substation safety requirements ps.
Defining KPIs as general functions of the APD probability
distributions is a flexible way to take into account DSO re-
quirements. As an example, a KPI might define the probability
that the APD exceeds the substation safety power threshold
when such a threshold is at most v. Other typical KPIs would
rank APD probability distributions according to their similarity
to desired shapes (defined, e.g., starting from the electricity
quotations in the day-ahead market).
7) Parameters: Real-valued parameters ε, δ ∈ (0, 1) and
γ ∈ R+ defining, resp., tolerance and statistical confidence
of the computed estimated values of the APD probability
distribution (see Definition 1) and its discretisation step (see
Section II-B).
B. Outputs
The goal of APD-Analyser is to compute values for all the
given KPIs under the given inputs. As KPIs are functions
of the APD probability distributions for different values of
the substation safety requirements ps, the core computational
task of APD-Analyser is to compute, for each value v of the
substation safety requirements, the probability distribution of
the APD when the substation can safely provide power v. Such
a distribution in turn depends on the EPPs of all users and their
probabilistic deviation models.
Unfortunately, an exact computation of the required APD
probability distributions is prohibitive, because of its expo-
nential dependence in the number of users and time-slots
(see Section VI-C for an example). Hence, APD-Analyser
computes so called (ε, δ)-approximations (Definition 1) of the
probabilities of interest.
Formally, let [wmin, wmax] be the interval enclosing all
the possible values that the APD can take, given the
users EPPs and their deviation models (defining a bounded
range of possible deviations Du for each u ∈ U):
wmin = mint∈T
[∑
u∈U (1 + min(Du))pu(t)
]
and wmax =
maxt∈T
[∑
u∈U (1 + max(Du))pu(t)
]
. Let W be a covering
of [wmin, wmax] into a finite set of disjoint and contiguous
intervals of width γ (which we call power slots), i.e., W =
{[x, x+ γ) | x < wmax, x = wmin + kγ, k ∈ N} .
Let Vs = {v | ps(t) = v, t ∈ T } be the set of all the (dis-
tinct) values for the power safely provided by the substation
in some time slot. Also, for each v ∈ Vs and w ∈ W , let
Ψv(w) be the (exact but unknown) probability that the APD
takes a value within power slot w when the substation safety
threshold is v.
Then, APD-Analyser returns a set of functions {Ψ˜v : W →
R∪ {⊥} | v ∈ Vs} (with ⊥ being a distinguished value) such
that, for each v ∈ Vs, Ψ˜v has the following properties (see
Theorem 1):
• if Ψ˜v(w) = ⊥ for a power slot w ∈ W , then, with
statistical confidence at least 1−δ, the probability Ψv(w)
is less than ε;
• for all the other power slots w, with statistical confidence
at least 1− δ, value Ψ˜v(w) is within (1± ε)Ψv(w).
III. RANDOM VARIABLE MEAN (ε, δ)-APPROXIMATION
Many applications, as our APD-Analyser, require the com-
putation of the mean value µZ for a 0/1 random variable
Z. When, as in our case, an exact computation is infeasible,
Monte Carlo methods are often used to compute an approxi-
mation of this quantity [17], [18].
The main idea is to consider N independent and identi-
cally distributed (iid) random variables Z1, . . . , ZN identical
to Z (having mean µZ), or, equivalently, N independent
realisations (samples) of the random variable Z, and to take
µ˜Z =
(Z1+···+ZN )
N as an approximation of µZ .
In order to have a formally guaranteed upper bound for the
error of this approximated computation, we exploit the notion
of (ε, δ)-approximation of the mean value of a random variable
(Definition 1).
Definition 1 ((ε, δ)-approximation, [17]). Let µZ be the
mean value for a 0/1 random variable Z and Z1, . . . , ZN
be N independent realisations (samples) of Z. Given ε
(tolerance) and δ (statistical confidence) in (0, 1), we say
that µ˜Z =
(Z1+···+ZN )
N is an (ε, δ)-approximation of µZ if:
Pr [(1− ε)µZ ≤ µ˜Z ≤ (1 + ε)µZ ] ≥ 1− δ.
IV. MONTE CARLO–BASED COMPUTATION OF APD
PROBABILITY (ε, δ)-APPROXIMATIONS
The APD-Analyser Monte Carlo–based algorithm com-
putes, for each distinct value v ∈ Vs of the substation safety
threshold in T and for each power slot w ∈ W , an (ε, δ)-
approximation Ψ˜v(w) of the probability that the APD takes a
value within w when the substation safety threshold is v.
Given the huge number of samples to be generated and
evaluated, a naive implementation of a Monte Carlo algorithm
to estimate an (ε, δ)-approximation Ψ˜v(w) of Ψv(w) for each
power slot w ∈W would be infeasible.
To this end, for each value v ∈ Vs, our algorithm generates
iid random samples of the APD, starting from the EPP and
the deviation model of each u ∈ U . Each generated APD
sample w ∈ W is used to define the realisation of a set of
|W | 0/1 random variables {Zi | i ∈W}, one per power slot,
where Zw is 1 and all the others are 0. Given a set of N iid
samples w1, . . . wN (in W ) generated as above, we have that,
for each power slot i ∈W , the 0/1 variables {Zi1, . . . ZiN} are
iid. This results in our algorithm effectively computing (ε, δ)-
approximations Ψ˜v(w) of Ψv(w) for each power slot w ∈W
using a single set of samples in W .
APD-Analyser combines two Statistical Model Checking
approaches. The first approach, based on the algorithm in
[17], restricted to 0/1 random variables, decides when to
stop sampling. The second approach, important to guarantee
termination on zero/low-probability areas of the computed
distribution, relies on Statistical Hypothesis Testing (along the
lines of [19], [20], [21]).
Our method uses the condition in [17] to decide whether Ni
is sufficiently large to guarantee that 1Ni
∑Ni
j=1 Z
i
j is a (ε, δ)-
approximation Ψ˜v(i) of the probability Ψv(i) that the APD
takes a value within power slot i when the substation safety
threshold is v. At the same time, if after a sufficiently large
number of samples Mi,
∑Mi
j=1 Z
i
j is still 0 for some power
slot i, the algorithm concludes that, with confidence at least
1− δ, Ψ˜v(i) < ε.
V. A PARALLEL ALGORITHM FOR APD-ANALYSER
Our APD-Analyser algorithm has been designed as to be
massively parallelised on a HPC infrastructure.
To this end, the computation is split in many Workers
(Section V-A) and one Orchestrator (Section V-B).
A. Workers
Each worker runs in parallel upon requests from the Orches-
trator. To reduce the overhead due to network communication,
each invocation to a worker triggers the generation of a high
number c of samples. Each sample of the APD (when the
substation safety threshold is v) is generated as follows:
1) A time slot t ∈ Tv = {t|t ∈ T , ps(t) = v} is extracted
uniformly at random (as time slots have equal duration).
2) For each user u ∈ U , a deviation du ∈ Du is extracted
according to the deviation model of u (i.e., using proba-
bility density function devu).
3) The APD value in time-slot t resulting from the extracted
user deviations is computed as A =
∑
u∈U (1 + du)pu(t)
and associated to its power slot w = [a, a+γ) ∈W (i.e.,
w is such that a ≤ A < a+ γ).
At the end of each sampling task, the c generated samples
(power slots) are sent back to the Orchestrator.
B. Orchestrator
The Orchestrator runs the two Statistical Model Checking
algorithms by asking workers to generate new samples and
by properly aggregating the results. The Orchestrator runs a
round of the above for each substation power value v ∈ Vs.
For each round (i.e., for each v ∈ Vs) and for each power slot
w ∈ W , the computation state of Ψ˜v(w) may be in one of
two phases, which evolve independently. Also, for each power
slot w ∈W , the following null hypothesis Hw0 is formulated:
“Ψv(w) ≥ ε”.
Phase 1: 0/1 samples are generated for w (starting from
the samples over W as described earlier) until one of two
conditions arises:
(a) Υ1 samples are 1 (where Υ1 is a function of ε and δ as
defined in [17]).
(b) The first dln(δ)/ ln(1− ε)e samples are all 0.
Let Nw1 be the number of samples generated for w. In
case (a), a first estimation of Ψv(w) is computed as ratio Υ1Nw1 ,
and the computation proceeds with “Phase 2”.
In case (b), the null hypothesis Hw0 is rejected, thus
declaring that Ψv(w) < ε. This Statistical Hypothesis Re-
jection procedure is known to be a one-sided error decision
algorithm, as it may introduce a type-I error (i.e., the al-
gorithm might reject Hw0 when it actually holds). However,
from [19] it follows that the probability of such an error,
Pr
[
Zw1 = · · ·ZwN1 = 0 | Hw0
]
< δ. This equivalently tells us
that Hw0 is rejected with confidence at least 1− δ. In case (b)
value for Ψ˜v(w) is set to special value ⊥ and the computation
for power slot w moves to state “Done”.
Phase 2: For any power slot w for which the computation
state of Ψ˜v(w) is “Phase 2”, the Orchestrator waits until
a number of samples greater than Nw2 is collected. Value
for Nw2 is computed during “Phase 1”, and depends on the
first estimate of Ψ˜v(w) computed therein. Value for Nw2 is
needed in Phase 2 to compute the number of additional
samples Nw3 that must be generated to compute the final
(ε, δ)-approximation of Ψ˜v(w). When such additional Nw3 0/1
samples {Zw1 , . . . , ZwNw3 } are generated by the workers, the
final Ψ˜v(w) is set to 1Nw3
∑Nw3
i=1 Z
w
i and the computation for
w is set to state “Done”.
The Orchestrator terminates the round for v ∈ Vs when the
computation process of Ψ˜v(w) is in state “Done” for all power
slots w ∈W .
C. Algorithm correctness
The following result holds (proof omitted for lack of space).
Theorem 1. For each v ∈ Vs and each w ∈W , let Ψ˜v(w) be
the (unknown) probability that the Aggregated Power Demand
(APD) is within power slot w in a time slot extracted from
Tv = {t|t ∈ T , ps(t) = v} uniformly at random, when
each user u ∈ U independently deviates from the predicted
collaborative profile pu according to the deviation model devu.
Value Ψ˜v(w) computed by the algorithm above is such that:
1) If Ψ˜v(w) = ⊥, then Ψv(w) < ε with confidence ≥ 1− δ.
2) Otherwise, Ψ˜v(w) is a (ε, δ)-approximation of Ψv(w).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present experiments aiming at evalu-
ating our C implementation of APD-Analyser in computing
an (ε, δ)-approximation of APD probability values and the
computational scalability of our parallel algorithm.
A. Case study
For our case study, we used real electricity usage data from
130 residential households (set U) connected to a substation
of a medium voltage distribution network in Denmark (data
courtesy of SEAS-NVE). EPPs for all users are defined with a
granularity of 60 minutes. The (constant) safety threshold for
APD is 400 kW, as this is the substation nominal power.
We adopted the same deviation model for all users u ∈ U ,
which defines the range of possible deviations as Du =
[−0.4, 0.4] and density function devu defined as: devu(x) =
0.4δ (x) + 0.2δ (x− 0.2) + 0.2δ (x+ 0.2) + 0.1δ (x− 0.4) +
0.1δ (x+ 0.4) (where δ (x) is the Dirac delta function). That
is, users can deviate from their EPPs with non-zero probability
in 5 possible ways, although very generously (as the largest
possible deviations are as large as ±40% and occur with
probability as high as 10%). Using a finite number of user
deviations was dictated by the structure of our data and
specifications from the DSO. However, we stress that such
a choice has no impact on the performance of our tool,
which uses standard libraries for the efficient sampling from
continuous distributions.
B. Experimental setting
We ran our APD-Analyser on a HPC infrastructure, allo-
cating up to 81 nodes (1 Orchestrator and up to 80 workers).
Each process ran on a node consisting of an Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU with a frequency varying within 2.27–2.83 GHz, and had
access to 1 GB of RAM.
C. Computation of APD probability distributions
In order to assess effectiveness of our parallel algorithm
to compute (ε, δ)-approximations of the APD probability
distribution values, we considered a very challenging scenario
from our case study.
In particular, using data from all the 130 users in our dataset,
we computed (ε, δ)-approximations of the APD probability
distribution values for each month of the year (time slot
duration: 1 day). As each of the 130 users can independently
deviate from their EPPs by 5 possible factors for each time
slot, the overall allowed number of combinations of user
deviations is approximately 530×130. This makes an exhaustive
exploration of the space of user deviations (hence an exact
computation of the APD distribution) clearly impossible. We
set ε, δ and γ to small values, namely ε = δ = 5% (5×10−2),
γ = 20 kW (i.e., 5% of the substation nominal power). Finally,
to reduce network overhead, we set each worker as to generate
c = 2× 104 samples per single Orchestrator request.
Figure 1 shows the APD probability distribution computed
by our algorithm for each month under these settings. Each of
the 12 computations took between 4782 seconds and 6448 sec-
onds (average: 5297 seconds, i.e., 1 hour, 28 minutes and 17
seconds) using 80 workers, and involved the generation of a
number of samples ranging from ≈ 1.6× 109 to ≈ 2.2× 109
(average: ≈ 1.8× 109 samples).
With current Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) pricing
schemes, the cost for such a computation would be of around
Eur 2.80, i.e., as small as Eur 0.02 per user per day.1
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Figure 1: Monthly APD (in kW) probability distributions, as
computed by our algorithm (ε = δ = 5%, γ = 20 kW) on our
case study scenarios.
D. Scalability analysis
In order to evaluate the scalability of our parallel al-
gorithm, we ran additional experiments by varying k, the
number of used parallel workers/computational nodes (k ∈
{1, 20, 40, 60, 80}), and measuring the number of samples
per second generated (and processed by the Orchestrator) in
each configuration. For each value of k, we computed the
speedup and efficiency of our parallel algorithm as sks1 and
1June 2018 prices for 80 Google g1-small nodes for 90 minutes, see
https://cloud.google.com/products/calculator
sk
s1×k resp., where sk and s1 are the number of samples per
second received and aggregated by the Orchestrator when
using, respectively, k and 1 workers (see, e.g., [22]).
Table I shows that our parallel algorithm scales very well
with the number of workers (computational nodes), with
efficiency values stabilising at around 70%, a typical value
in cluster environments.
The short computation time needed by APD-Analyser
clearly enables its online usage, in order to compute the KPI
values for multiple candidate price policies, hence assisting
the DSO in price policy design. To this end, it is worth
noting that the stable efficiency of our parallel algorithm (as
shown in Table I) allows DSOs to compress computation times
by increasing the number of computational nodes used (with
no substantial additional IaaS cost). For example, using 501
computational cores (i.e., 1 Orchestrator and 500 Workers)
and assuming an efficiency of 70%, the expected computation
time would have been of just 15 minutes (for an IaaS cost of
around Eur 2.90 per day, i.e., Eur 0.02 per user per day, see
Footnote 1).
# workers samples/sec speedup efficiency
1 5924.89 1× 100%
20 79275.028 13.38× 66.90%
40 162578.98 27.44× 68.60%
60 257791.96 43.51× 72.52%
80 335823.24 56.68× 70.85%
Table I: APD-Analyser parallel algorithm scalability.
VII. RELATED WORK
In statistical model checking approaches (see, e.g., [23],
[24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [19], [17]), scenarios are
sampled until a certain degree of confidence in the estimated
probability is achieved. APD-Analyser is based on such tech-
niques, and employs a parallel version of the algorithms in
[19], [17], also adapting them to the smart grid context. There
exist other works adapting statistical model checking tech-
niques to smart grids, see, e.g., [30], [31], which however are
based on sequential (non-parallel) algorithms. In a smart grid
context, usage of exhaustive (instead of statistical) methods for
safety analysis has been studied, e.g., in [32], [33], [34]. All
such works are plagued by the state explosion problem. Since
APD-Analyser aims at evaluating safety of a large system (a
substation connecting hundreds of end-users), exhaustive or
non-massively-parallel approaches cannot be used.
Monte Carlo–based methods aiming at evaluating the aver-
age behaviour of the system under analysis are widely used
in performance evaluation where, typically, the average case
is the most interesting one. However such methods, used in a
smart grid context for example in [35], [36], are not very well
suited for safety analysis, since they cannot address rare (low
probability) events and, most importantly, do not provide any
lower bound for the statistical confidence achieved.
Performance evaluation can also be done using suitable
benchmarks. This is often quite interesting since it guarantees
that the system is evaluated on relevant case studies (see,
e.g., [37], [38]). However, this approach cannot be used for
safety verification, since it cannot provide an upper bound to
the probability that a potentially unsafe scenario has not been
considered in the analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented APD-Analyser, a HPC-based
software system aimed at supporting DSOs in analysing
the possible aggregated effects, on an EDN substation, of
new envisioned, possibly highly-fluctuating and individualised
price policies for electricity end-users. APD-Analyser uses
information about DSO-expected user behaviours under the
new policies as well as probabilistic models of user devia-
tions from such expected behaviours, thus acting both as a
Decision Support System (as it allows what-if analyses) and
as an automated verifier for the safety of an envisioned set
of price policies. In particular, APD-Analyser enables safety
assessment of the price policies computed through automated
methods as part of highly dynamic ADR schemas.
Feasibility and scalability of the system have been assessed
by using realistic scenarios taken from an existing medium
voltage Danish distribution network.
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